Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

The State of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent v.
Ronnie Lee Gardner, Defendant and Appellant :
Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Sandra L. Sjogren; Kimberley K. Hornak; Attorney for
Respondent.
Andrew A. Valdez; James A. Valdez; Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Gardner, No. 198721027.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1824

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PHK STATE OF UTAH,
!^

Plaintiff-Respondent

v.
asn

RONNIE LEE GARDNER.,

2 TO* 1 7

rjo .

ategory

Nn

i

Defendant-Appeilanf

REPLY BRIEF OP APPELLANT

>t'jn:;;
•-

< >-. ^ t c e m p t e c •.. r : ^ i r a .

Degree,

an:

one

(' "

.,

a «—-'

,

,Judgf f

^i"

,o T

' r :*= F e i o i .

i,

P o s s e s s i o n o f a Danopr

u. aiiu I ui. J i i l L

E. Banks,

H ^r iv . dc ^ v ~ ^ n * ^

•.— ^i^^pnn

Lake Cou M , ^ c a ; - . -

-

'rah,

IP H c n o r i i c ' e

A N T 7 ^ . . VALDEZ
JAMES ^ 7ALDEZ
JOAN Ct WAT "
SALT LAKE LHGAL DEFENDER ASSOC,
333 S o u t h S e c o n d F a s t
S a l t Lake Z : t y , Utah
Telephone:
S 32 — 5£4
A t ' •) r n ey s r •r A p p ^ 1 ; ^,, .

DAVID L. WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
SANDRA L. SJOGREN and
KIMBERLEY K. HORNAF

RL
SF'P
p

a

traced

presiding.

2 3 6 S t a t e C a p l t c i B u _ . JH.CJ
S a l t L a k e c : ty ,
;ah
34114
Attorney
Respondent

one

^ _.*"

:' •JOQ7

Clerk, Supreme c•O'J.".,

"w'w.i •

Jay

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
v.
Case No. 21027
Category No. 1

RONNIE LEE GARDNER,
Defendant-Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction and judgment for one count of
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Felony; one
count of Attempted Criminal Homicide, Attempted Murder in the First
Degree, a First Degree Felony; one count of Aggravated Kidnapping, a
First Degree Felony; one count of Escape, a Second Degree Felony;
and one count of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by an Incarcerated
Person, a Second Degree Felony, in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay
E. Banks, Judge, presiding.

ANDREW A. VALDEZ
JAMES A. VALDEZ
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC<
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone: 532-5444
Attorneys for Appellant
DAVID L. WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
SANDRA L. SJOGREN and
KIMBERLEY K. HORNAK
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

. . .

INTRODUCTION

iii
1

ARGUMENT:
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING MR. GARDNER'S MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF
VENUE
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECUSAL

10

POINT III: THE UTAH DEATH PENALTY STATUTE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED BECAUSE THE USE OF
THE SAME AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN BOTH THE
GUILT AND PENALTY PHASES SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF
PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT AND FAILS TO NARROW THE
CLASS OF PERSONS CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER . 12
POINT VI: THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES CHARGED
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §7 6-5-202(1)(h) IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ALLOWS PREJUDICIAL
INFORMATION TO THE JURY DENYING DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL

15

POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY NOT GRANTING AN APPROPRIATE CHALLENGE
FOR CAUSE

22

POINT VIII: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
SECURITY GUARDS TO SURROUND MR. GARDNER DURING
TRIAL

23

POINT X: THE TESTIMONY OF OFFICER JORGENSON SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED SINCE THE INFORMATION
WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF MR. GARDNER'S FIFTH
AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND DOES NOT QUALIFY
FOR THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION
28
POINT XI: THE TRIAL COURT'S INCORRECT DEFINITION
OF MANSLAUGHTER IN JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 21
PRECLUDED JURY CONSIDERATION OF THE EXTREME
DISTURBANCE THEORY OF THE CASE

31

POINT XII: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSES COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED AFTER UNANIMOUSLY
FINDING THAT MR. GARDNER DID NOT COMMIT FIRST DEGREE
HOMICIDE
35
- i-

(CONTINUED)

PAGE

POINT XIV: MR. GARDNER WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL DUE TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT . . . .

37

POINT XVI: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO RECEIVE TWO PIECES OF RELEVANT
MITIGATING EVIDENCE
39
POINT XVII: UTAH STATUTE AND CONSTITUTION ESTABLISH
THAT IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THIS CASE IS
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
44
CONCLUSION

49

- ii -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443 (11th Cir. 1983) Cert.
Denied 464 U.S. 1063 (1984)

14

Anderson v. Industrial Commission of Utah/ 696 P.2d 1219
(Utah 1985)

11

Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983)

41,45,47

Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980)

42,47

Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1986)

21

Booth v. Maryland, 86-5070, 41 Crim. L. Rep. (decided
June 15, 1987)
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)

43
21

Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1985) (Cert. Denied),
106 S.Ct. 546 (1985)
13,14
Commonwealth v. Brown, 305 N.E. 2d 830 (1973)

26

Commonwealth v. DeVasto, 387 N.E. 2d 1173 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979)

25

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)

19,42

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977)

19,36

Government of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278 (3rd Cir.
1976)
17,21
Gray v. Lucan, 677 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1982) cert, denied,
461 U.S. 910 (1983)

14

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)

19,43,45

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)

29

Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520 (Utah 1948)

10

Hitchcock v. Dugger, 85-6756, 41 Crim. L. Rep. 3071
(decided April 22, 1987)
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S.

, 89 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1986) . . .24,27

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed. 2d
751 (1961)
Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987)
Maine v. Superior Court of Mendocino County, 438 P.2d
-iT>

tn^Mf

-\Ct6.a\

39

4,7
14
4

(CONTINUED)

PAGE

McClellan v. Kentucky, 715 s.W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1986)

14

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1984)

29

Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 298 (1984)

29

Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812 (Utah 1980)

12

People v. District Court in and for Third Judicial
District, 192 Colo. 503, 560 P.2d 828 (Colo. 1977). 11
Potashnich v. Port City Construction Co., 609 F.2d 1101
(5th Cir. 1980) cert, denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980) . 11
Pulley v. Harris, 466 U.S. 37 (1984)

44

Ruiz v. State, 582 S.W. 2d 915 (Ark. 1979)

6,7,8

Singleton v. Lockhart, 653 F. Supp. 1114 (Ark. 1986) . . . .

14

Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S.

39

, (1986)

Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967)

19,20

Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978) . . .42
State v. Ahrens, 479 P.2d 786 (Utah 1971)

8

State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986)

22

State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986)

21,44

State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986)

20

State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980)

13

State v. Busby, 464 So. 2d 262 (La. 1985)

38

State v. Byington, 200 P.2d 723 (Utah 1948) (overruled
other grounds in First Federal Savings and Loan
Assn. v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984) . . . 12
State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 624 (Utah 1983)

35

State v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983)

27

State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (1976)

34

State v. Gellatly, 449 P.2d 993 (Utah 1969)

4

State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980)

20

State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983)
- iv -

15,19,23

(CONTINUED)

PAGE

State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985) . . . .

18

State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977)

2,3,13

State v. Roberts, 206 A.2d 200 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1965)

27

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985)

20

State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1980)

30

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984)

37,38

State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1971)

1,4,15,36,38,41,45,46

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978)

25

United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 497
F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1974)

11

United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000 (3rd Cir. 1976) . . . . 17
United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1955) . . 17,21
United States v. Foskey, 636 P.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980) . . . 17
United States v. Lester, 491 F.2d 680 (6th Cir.)

29

United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980)

29

United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1979) . .29
United States v. Sisto, 543 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1976) . . . . 29
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)

29

Walker v. Holiday Lanes, 413 P.2d 63 (Kansas 1966)

8

Wilkett v. State, 674 P.2d 573 (Okla. Crim. Spp. 1984) . . . 10
Woodard v. Sargent, 806 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1986)

14

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)

36,43

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983)

21

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202 (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (Supp. 1985)
- v -

15,16
31,32,33,34

(CONTINUED)

PAGE

Utah Code Ann. §77-35-19(a) (1953 as amended)

36

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-207(2) (1953 as amended)

40,41

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-104 (1953 as amended)

45,47,49

Article I, §7, Utah Constitution

15

Article I, §12, Utah Constitution

15

Article I, §9, Utah Constitution

21,44

Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution

15,28

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution

15

Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution

28,29

Eighth Amendment, United States Constitution

44,46

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Model Penal Code §210.6

18

Model Penal Code §201.3

34

McCormick on Evidence, P. 513

30

- vi -

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

:
:

RONNIE LEE GARDNER,

:

Defendant-Appellant

Case No. 21027
Category No, 1

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
The Statement of Issues, Statement of Case, and Summary of
Argument are set forth in Appellant's opening brief.

Mr. Gardner

takes this opportunity to reply to Points I, II, III, VI, VII, VIII,
X, XI, XII, XIV, XVI and XVII of Respondent's Brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
(Reply to Respondent's Point I)
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
MR. GARDNER'S MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE.
The State claims that the mere dissemination of news
thought to be prejudicial to a defendant does not normally entitle
him to prevail on a motion for a change of venue and argues that Mr.
Gardner made only a bare allegation of prejudice, which is patently
inadequate to justify a change of venue. The State relies on State
v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981) for the statement, "(t)he mere
demonstration that some dissemination of news thought to be
prejudicial to a defendant has occurred does not normally entitle
him to prevail on a motion for change of venue." Wood is

distinguishable from the present case in that Wood's motion for a
change of venue was supported only by defense counsel's affidavit to
which was attached a single newspaper article reporting the
gratitude of the victim's father for the manner in which his family
had been taken care of by local authorities and giving a short
account of the crime.
The State relies on State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah
1977), and asks the Court to reach the same conclusion that "this is
not one of those exceptional cases where pretrial publicity
exacerbated by State complicity encouraged the jurors to form such
strong preconceived views of defendant's guilt as to be considered
inherently prejudicial against him."

(Respondent's Brief at 15).

In State v. Pierre, supra, the trial had already been moved from
Weber to Davis County as the result of a previous motion for change
of venue.

In his second motion for change of venue, the defendant

contended that Salt Lake County was the only county where he could
receive a fair trial. Unlike Pierre, the media coverage of Gardner
occurred almost immediately after the courthouse shooting with
detailed news reports and photos showing Gardner at the crime scene
in a blood-soaked shirt, sitting on the lawn surrounded by lawmen as
reporters detailed the events that had just transpired.
Furthermore, as jurors recalled, there were shots of the victims
being loaded into ambulances and reports of Gardner's prior criminal
convictions.
In addition, as asserted in Appellant's opening brief at
22-26, news reports were biased in that they repeatedly referred to
Mr. Gardner as a violent man who committed a prior murder and made
repeated escape attempts, and who required extensive security.
- 2 -

The

media went beyond trying Mr. Gardner; it simply assumed his guilt.
(See Appellant's Opening Brief at 22-9 and Addendum F and Addendum G
in Appellant's Brief).

And, in addition to the abuse by state

officials asserted by Mr. Gardner in his opening brief at 25-27,
Sheriff Hayward committed perhaps the most flagrant abuse when he
made his comment that Mr. Gardner was a dangerous man against whom
deadly force should have been used and that prison guards should
have shot him until he was down and dead.

Salt Lake Tribune

(Trib.), April 9, 1985, Exhibit D-7; Deseret News, April 10, 1985,
Exhibit D-7, See Addendum F, Appellant's Opening Brief. The
exposure of potential jurors who ultimately would decide whether Mr.
Gardner should be given a life or death sentence to "official"
comments of this nature contrasts sharply with the circumstances in
Pierre.
The State argues that only the Dan Jones' poll was used to
show community prejudice and none of the jurors' statements were
used to support the argument (Brief of Respondent at 16-17).

On the

contrary, Mr. Gardner asserts in his opening brief at 30-31
11

(iinspection of the jury voir dire reveals that a significant

segment of the potential jurors were admittedly prejudiced against
Mr. Gardner."

The first motion was made and decided at the pretrial

stage before the venire was seated.

At that stage,the only possible

evidence of potential prejudice which could be presented were the
news articles and opinion poll.

Until the jury venire was

questioned, evidence of the prejudicial effect of the publicity on
the potential jurors did not exist.
This court should find that the opinion poll is a valid
evaluation of community prejudice.

The respondent has stated that

the Dan Jones' opinion poll "leaps to the conclusion" that the

Gardner jury must have been prejudiced and is nothing more than a
bare allegation of prejudice.

For support, the state again cites

Wood and State v. Gellatly, 449 P.2d 993 (Utah 1969), neither of
which sets a standard for measuring what is an acceptable allegation
of prejudice nor deals with a public opinion poll, but only state
what is not an adequate allegation of prejudice.

As such, the Court

should consider the standard set forth in Maine v. Superior Court of
Mendocino County, 438 P.2d 372 (California 1968) which provides:
A motion for change of venue or continuance shall
be granted whenever it is determined that because
of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial
material, there is a reasonable likelihood that
in the absence of such relief, a fair trial
cannot be had. This determination may be based
on such evidence as qualified public opinion
surveys or opinion testimony offered by
individuals, or on the court's own evaluation of
the nature, frequency, and timing of the material
involved.
Id. at 377 citing "Standards for Granting the Motion" from The
Reardon Report, an American Bar Association Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice.

In any event, the nexus between

community prejudice and jury prejudice should be grounds for
granting a motion for change of venue.

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,

6 L.Ed.2d 751, 81 S.Ct. 1639 (1961).
In addition, once the potential jury was voir dired, the
courtfs error in failing to grant the motion for change of venue was
clarified by juror responses. All twelve of the jurors who served
in the Gardner trial were familiar with the facts of the case; many
recalled detailed events and vivid images of the crime as it was
reported either on television, radio, or in the newspapers.
Furthermore, eight of the jurors, prior to their rehabilitation,
made statements reflecting that they had a predisposed opinion as to
_ 4 _

Mr. Gardner's guilt, were subjected to the opinions of their peers
regarding Mr. Gardner's guilt, or did not feel comfortable being on
the Gardner jury.1

1

Three of the jurors were not rehabilitated after

*
Mrs. Whitelock (R. 1501-1513) recalled seeing Mr. Gardner
sitting on the courthouse lawn and having an initial reaction of
"Well, at least he got hurt, too." (R. 1508).
Mr. Miller (R. 1540-1551) during his voirdire expressed his
initial reaction:
Mr. Andrew Valdez: Do you recall your reaction to that
image? Did you have a reaction at all?
Mr. Miller: Well, as it came out earlier, I had formed an
opinion. I felt that it was Mr. Gardner at that time.
Mr. Andrew Valdez: That he was guilty?
Mr. Miller: Yes, that he had fired the shots.
(R. 1545-1546). Mr. Miller had also discussed the incident with
various peers, some of whom had expressed an opinion that Mr.
Gardner should be executed.
Mr.Jones (R. 1551-1558) said his understanding of the case
was that the defense only wanted to save Gardner's life, "that they
figured he was guilty." (R. 1552). He was never rehabilitated on
this point.
Mr. Dansie (R. 1578-1591) had knowledge of much of Mr.
Gardner's prior criminal activity. He noted the hospital escape,
the Cheers Tavern shooting, and a note he believed Mr. Gardner had
left after the commission of a crime. He was also very familiar
with the facts of the courthouse killing, specifically remembering a
story he had read regarding the victim, Mr. Burdell, and that he had
discussed this with his wife. He stated during his voir dire, "[I]
would assume from reading the paper that he actually did shoot that
lawyer, yes. I think he shot the lawyer." (R. 1585). Further, he
stated, "As far as Mr. Gardner goes, I don't know the circumstances,
how it come about or anything, why he killed him or what the deal
was. I assume it was an escape." The court did not grant the
defense's challenge of Mr. Dansie.
Mr. Nicholl (R. 1729-1740) said the main thing he
remembered regarding Gardner was "the television constantly showing
the footage of Mr. Gardner on the gurney with blood all over his
shirt." (R. 1729-1730). Further, Mr.Nicholl had discussed the case
with his wife and later with his father who had stated that he
believed Gardner was probably guilty.
Mrs. Halander (R. 1757-1767) said she believed being on the
Gardner jury was kind of scary, "kind of astonishing." (R.
1764-1765).
Mr. Borton (R. 1822-1834) made the statement that his
initial reaction was "[H]e did it, I guess. He was there on TV and
they had had handcuffs on him, so I assume that he was the one who
did it." (R. 1831) .
Mrs. Davies (R. 1432-1442) had discussed the case with a
co-employee who had formed the opinion that Mr. Gardner was guilty.
See also: Mrs. Cline (R. 1676-1687); Mrs. Brewer (R.
1702-1711); Mrs. Barrett (R. 1356-1360); Mrs. Hansen (R.
1417-1424).

making prejudicial statements or giving a recall of the facts to see
if they could set aside their opinions or what they already knew of
the case.2
The logic of Ruiz v. State, 582 S.W.2d 915 (Ark. 1979),
applies in this case. The Ruiz court found that where 10 of 12
jurors had been subjected to extensive media coverage giving
saturation point coverage to the alleged crimes, even though jurors
believed they were being honest when they stated they thought they
could give the appellants a fair and impartial trial "it would be
almost impossible for any person to completely remove these
materials from his mind while serving as a juror in this case."

Id.

at 923.
In addition to the final twelve jurors, many of the
venirepersons made prejudicial statements during the individual and
group voir dire indicating that they also had a predisposed opinion
to Mr. Gardner's guilt, had been subjected to the opinions of their
peers, or would not feel comfortable being on the Gardner jury, all
influences that may be hard for a juror to set aside.
Of the 80 venirepersons three were dismissed prior to the
group voir dire. During the group voir dire 50 of the remaining 77
venirepersons said that they had discussed the case either with
family, friends or acquaintances.
Furthermore, of the remaining 77, 45 venirepersons said
that prior to jury duty they had formed an opinion as to the guilt
or innocence of Mr. Gardner, and of these 24 said they would have a

2

Mr. Jones, (R. 1551-1558); Mr. Dansie, (R. 1578-1581); and
Mrs. Brewer, (R. 1702-1711).
- 6 -

difficult time setting aside their pre-established opinions. Most
of these were of the 21 dismissed for cause prior to the individual
voir dire. However, of the remaining 57 venirepersons many (24) made
statements reflecting that they had opinions or had been subjected
to opinions that would be difficult to set aside. All but one were
familiar with the facts. See Addendum A.
The jurors1 knowledge of the case, coupled with the Dan
Jones1 poll in which the vast majority of voters in Salt Lake County
were calculated to have heard, seen, or read of the case and,
furthermore, that 90% had formed the opinion that Mr. Gardner was
guilty and three-quarters believed he should be sentenced to death
supports the claim that it was impossible to seat an impartial jury
in Salt Lake County.

The language in Ruiz is again appropriate:

The material presented during the hearing on the
motion for a change of venue and during the voir
dire examination revealed that there were wide
spread beliefs in the community that the
appellants were guilty before the trial actually
started. There seems to be a pattern of ill
feeling toward the appellants in the community
and under these circumstances we believe bias or
prejudice may be presumed. Although the exact
question was not put, no juror stated that he was
100% sure that he could lay aside his previous
impressions or opinions.
Id. at 923.
The present case is also similar to Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S.717, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961), which held that there
was a pattern of deep and bitter prejudice shown to be present
throughout the community, which was clearly reflected in the sum
total of the voir dire examination of the jurors, that a fair trial
was not had.

- 7 -

The state also argues that the transfer from the
Metropolitan Hall of Justice to the City and County
Building—located across the street from one another—should not be
grounds for a change of venue as "jurors often request to view the
scene of the crime during a trial so they can better understand the
evidence."

(Respondent's Brief at 18). Therefore, the state

appears to argue, the proximity of the trial to the scene of the
crime would not necessarily make the location of the trial
prejudicial to the defendant as it would be of benefit to jurors to
have the locale of the crime nearby.
Juror visitations to the scene of a crime have always been
done under controlled circumstances and jurors have not been allowed
to be in a position where they are free to roam the scene of the
crime as it may conjure up prejudicial images. Juror misconduct
occurs where a juror conducts an independent investigation.
v. Holiday Lanes, 413 P.2d 63 (Kansas 1966).

Walker

And as stated in State

v. Ahrens, 479 P.2d 786 (Utah 1971):
If the efficacy of the jury system is to be
preserved the courts cannot permit individual
jurors to make private and individual
investigations of the facts of the case they are
impaneled to decide. We have no way of
determining whether or not the conduct of the
juror influenced his judgment in arriving at a
verdict.
Id. at 787.
And while the record does not establish that any jurors
visited the scene of the crime, even the respondent's brief supports
the argument that the temptation to investigate the scene of the
crime may have been too great as a juror could easily walk to the
scene during a recess or as they went by the Municipal Building on
- 8 -

their way to and from the City and County Building,

Additionally,

the very presence of the scene of the crime within close proximity
to the trial may have been enough to unduly influence a juror with
his verdict, a factor the court has no way of determining. Utah,
then, should adopt the logic of Ruiz when the court granted a change
of venue to another county:
The site of the trial could have been changed to
any courthouse in the district [covering three
counties] and would have been more distant from
the actual scene of the crime and the center of
publicity and the resentment which naturally
built around this case than the site where the
trial was held.
Id. at 921.
Finally, respondent argues "it is unlikely that venue could
have been transferred to a county which was unfamiliar with this
case."

(Respondent's Brief at 18). As support respondent argues

that Utah has only three television stations which broadcast
throughout the entire state as well as areas of Idaho, Wyoming, and
Nevada, apparently making the assumption that all potential jurors
in the state of Utah receive all of their news from one of the three
stations.
However, in addition to Utah's two PBS stations
broadcasting statewide—one of which broadcasts its own news program
concentrating primarily on Utah County news—many of the counties
bordering Utah's neighbor states also receive out-of-state
broadcasts.

Furthermore, there are a myriad of radio stations

operating in the state, many of which logically would not have given
the Gardner incident nearly as much attention as the Salt Lake
County stations. And, finally, many of the counties in the state
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have their own daily newspapers which, understandably, would not
have given the courthouse shooting the sensational publicity it
received in the Salt Lake papers.
The record in this case indicates that prejudicial
publicity regarding Mr, Gardner and the incidents involved in the
present case was widely disseminated throughout Salt Lake County.
The actual reports, Dan Jones opinion poll and juror responses
establish that Mr. Gardner could not receive a fair trial in Salt
Lake County.

The trial judge abused his discretion in failing to

transfer the case to a county where the courthouse was not in close
proximity to the scene of the crime and where potential jurors had
not been inundated which prejudicial publicity.
POINT II
(Reply to Respondent's Point II)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR RECUSAL.
Both the state and Mr,, Gardner relied on Haslam v.
Morrison, 190 P.2d 520 (Utah 1948) for statements regarding their
position on the recusal issue. A contextual reading of the
paragraph from which the sentences quoted by both parties are taken
supports the idea that in the interest of maintaining the purity and
integrity of the judicial process, a defendant need not allege
actual bias, but only the strong appearance of bias to urge a judge
to recuse himself.
The general practice in this jurisdiction has
been for judges to disqualify themselves whenever
an affidavit of bias and prejudice against them
has been filed. As a general rule, we think this
is a commendable practice. The purity and
integrity of the judicial process ought to be
protected against any taint of suspicion to the
- 10 -

end that the public and litigants may have the
highest confidence in the integrity and fairness
of the courts. This is not to say that the mere
filing of an affidavit of bias and prejudice,
ipso facto casts such suspicion on the judge, and
upon his integrity and fairness, that he ought to
disqualify himself. However, it is ordinarily
better for a judge to disqualify himself even
though he may be entirely free of bias and
prejudice if either litigant files an affidavit
of bias and prejudice. "Next in importance to
the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is
that of doing it in such a manner as will beget
no suspicion of the fairness or integrity of the
judge."
Id. at 523-24 citing Crook v. Newborg & Son, 124 Ala. 479, 27 So.
432, 433, 82 Am.St. Rep. 190; 30 Am.Jur. 767, Judges, Sec. 53.
Further, the states makes an effort to distinguish the
cases relied upon by Mr. Gardner, Anderson v. Industrial Commission
of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985); Wilkett v. State, 674 P.2d 573
(Okla. Crim. App. 1984); People v. District Court in and for Third
Judicial District, 192 Colo. 503, 560 P.2d 828 (Colo. 1911);
Potashnich v. Port City Const. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980)
cert, denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); and United States v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 497 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1974) for the
purpose of showing that the circumstances of these cases differ from
the present case in instances where a motion for recusal was granted
on an allegation of the appearance of bias or prejudice alone.
However, in recanting a general summary of the facts of the above
cases, while the state has shown that the circumstances of each case
are distinct, they have also shown that the courts in a number of
instances, in an effort to maintain their integrity and remove
themselves from even the most remote possibility of prejudice or
bias, have recused themselves from a case even if no actual
prejudice is shown, but only an appearance of prejudice.

The state also relies on State v. Byington, 200 P.2d 723
(Utah 1948)(overruled on other grounds in First Federal Savings and
Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P„2d 1257, 1263 (Utah 1984)) for the
holding that a defendant must establish actual bias and prejudice in
making a motion for recusal. However, it should be noted that the
Byington court cited the paragraph quoted above in this reply, in
full, saying "it should suggest to trial judges what this court
believes to be the better practice when an affidavit of bias and
prejudice is filed in good faith."

Id. at 726.

The State further asserts that "(a)lthough Judge Banks
ruled on evidentiary matters, defendant fails to cite any incidents
where Judge Banks made an erroneous ruling based upon bias."
Respondent's Brief at 22. A review of Appellant's opening brief
establishes that Appellant contends Judge Banks made a number of
erroneous rulings in this case.
The State has misapprehended the case law regarding motions
to recuse. Further, by its own response, the state has supported the
argument that the mere appearance of prejudice or bias is enough to
grant a motion for recusal.
POINT III
(Reply to Respondent's Point III)
THE UTAH DEATH PENALTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS APPLIED BECAUSE THE USE OF THE SAME
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN BOTH THE GUILT
AND PENALTY PHASES SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF PROOF
TO THE DEFENDANT AND FAILS TO NARROW THE CLASS
OF PERSONS CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER.
The State relies on Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812, 815
(Utah 1980) to support its contention that the burden of proof is
not shifted to the defendant in the penalty phase of capital
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homicide cases. While Justice Hall did reach that conclusion in his
written opinion, that opinion was joined by only one justice. Thus,
Pierre's written opinion represents the views of a plurality, not a
majority.

Justice Stewart, who concurred in the result in Pierre,

expressed different reasoning in State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 273
(Stewart, J., concurring)(Utah 1980), where he said:
In the penalty phase, after guilt has been
proved, the jury is necessarily aware that it has
found an aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the prosecution, in arguing
for imposition of the death penalty, will
undoubtedly dwell upon that fact. If the jury
may impose death merely by finding that
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances (a preponderance of evidence test)
a death penalty is virtually assured.
607 P.2d at 273-274.
Mr. Gardner asks this Court to turn away from the plurality
opinion in Pierre and instead find that Utah law unacceptably shifts
the burden from the prosecution to the defendant.
The State also contends that Utah's capital sentencing
procedure falls outside the holding of Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d
258 (8th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S.C. 546 (1985) by attempting
to limit the Collins rationale to cases involving felony-murder
capital homicide convictions. While the state correctly perceives a
distinction between some felony murder convictions and other types
of first degree murder convictions, that distinction is irrelevant
here.

The crime in Collins was robbery-murder.

The Court there

found the death penalty to be unconstitutionally applied because the
aggravating circumstance, murder for pecuniary gain, merely repeated
an element of the offense of murder in the course of a robbery.
at 264. The Court said the aggravating circumstances failed to
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Id.

fulfill the designated narrowing function because the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance did not distinguish some robber-murderers
from others.

Id.

In the same way, the Utah statute does not

distinguish among those murder-escapees (or persons or crimes
fitting into the other aggravating circumstances) convicted of First
Degree Murder who should be subject to the death penalty.
The State correctly notes that not all circuits have chosen
to follow the rationale, Adams v. Wainwright, 709F.2d 1443 (11th
Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984); Gray v. Lucan, 677
F.2d 1086, 1104-05 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 910
(1983).
This dispute between circuits will now be settled by the
U.S. Supreme Court which has agreed to hear Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 817
F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987).

Phelps is a 1987 Fifth Circuit case which

addresses the question of whether aggravating circumstances which
repeat an element of the underlying crime fail to narrow the class
of offenders eligible for the death penalty.
In addition, the Eighth Circuit has reaffirmed its
commitment to Collins. Woodard v. Sargent, 806 F.2d 153, 156 (8th
Cir., 1986); Singleton v. Lockhart, 653 F.Supp. 1114, 1135 (Ark.
1986).

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has also chosen to follow the

Collins rationale.

McClellan v.Kentucky, 715 S.W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1986).

Mr. Gardner asks the Utah Court to follow the reasoning in
Collins and find that the Utah statute unconstitutionally fails to
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.
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POINT VI
(Reply to Respondent's Point VI)
THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES CHARGED UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-202(1)(h) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS IT ALLOWS PRESENTATION OF PREJUDICIAL
INFORMATION TO THE JURY DENYING DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
The State charged Mr. Gardner under Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-202(1)(h), citing two prior robbery convictions:

February 22,

1980, and September 17, 1981 and evidence of such prior convictions
was presented to the jury at the guilt/innocence phase of the
trial.

Subsection (h) of the Utah Code Ann.§76-5-202(1) is

unconstitutional, and its use in the trial of Mr. Gardner prejudiced
the jury against him denying him due process and preventing him from
receiving a fair trial by an impartial jury pursuant to the
protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah
Constitution.3
The state acknowledges that even where an argument is not
made at trial that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional,
this Court on direct appeal in a capital case, will review the
record for "manifest and prejudicial" error.

State v. Norton, 675

P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983)(citing State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77
(Utah 1982)) .

3« This issue is currently before the Court in State v. Menzies,
Case No. 87011, an interlocutory appeal brought by the State after
Judge Raymond Uno of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah ruled that subsection (h) of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-202(1) is unconstitutional.
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Allowing evidence of prior convictions to reach the jury
during the guilt/innocence phase is unconstitutional for two related
reasons:

(1)

such evidence prejudices the jury against the accused

as jurors are more likely to convict because the accused is a bad
person rather than on the evidence presented relating to the
specific crime, and (2) such evidence of prior convictions has
nothing whatsoever to do with the factual circumstances of the
murder.

Whether a homicide was committed under circumstances which

elevate it to a capital homicide should be decided based on the
facts of the murder itself; evidence of prior convictions should be
considered only in determining the proper penalty.
Utah's legislature and this Court have recognized the
prejudicial impact of prior convictions reaching the jury during the
guilt phase of a trial, and mandated a bifurcated trial or severance
in situations where evidence of prior crimes is necessary to support
a charge (See Appellant's Brief at 59-63.)

In addition, Utah has

adopted the federal rules of evidence, including Rules 404 and 609,
which recognize the prejudicial impact of introducing prior
convictions as evidence at the guilt phase of a trial.
Subsection (h) is distinct from the other aggravating
circumstances contained in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1) in that the
prior conviction has no factual relationship to the events of the
homicide.^

The focus in the guilt/innocence phase of a capital

homicide trial should be on whether the accused committed the

4

* Only subsection (p) (the actor was under a sentence of life
imprisonment or a sentence of death at the time of the commission of
the homicide) is similar to (h) in that it focuses on the
defendant's prior crimes, rather than the specific activity involved
in the crime currently charged.
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homicide and, if so, the manner in which he carried out the murder.
Instead of focusing on the actual homicide, subsection (h) focuses
on the status of the accused as a previously convicted felon. Such
status is irrelevant in determining whether a homicide was committed
in a manner justifying treatment as a capital murder.
"A concomitant of the presumption of innocence" is that
"[i]t is fundamental to American jurisprudence that a defendant must
be tried for what he did not for who he is." United States v.
Foskey, 636 P.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v.
Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)).

On this issue the

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has added:
The accused is not only presumed to be innocent
of the crime with which he is charged, but our
legal tradition protects him from the possibility
of guilt by reputation. Evidence received by a
jury in a criminal prosecution must pass
stringent tests of competency and relevancy. A
defendant's previous brushes with the law, in and
of themselves, are simply irrelevant to his guilt
or innocence of the crime with which he is
charged. . . . When such evidence inadvertently
reaches the attention of the jury, it is most
difficult if not impossible to assume continued
integrity of the presumption of innocence. A
drop of ink cannot be removed from a glass of
milk.
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3rd
Cir. 1976).

Accord United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116

(D. C. Cir. 1985) (Evidence of prior crime always prejudicial to
defendant as it diverts attention of jury from question of
defendant's responsibility for crime charged to improper issue of
his bad character); United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1004 (3rd
Cir. 1976) (long standing tradition protects criminal defendant from
"guilt by reputation" and from "unnecessary prejudice".)
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The State's response that evidence of prior convictions is
an element of the crime fails to address the constitutional
challenge to subsection (h). 5
The State cites the Model Penal Code which offers the
rationale behind subsection (h) as an aggravating circumstance.
Brief of Respondent at 38. However, the Model Penal Code also
suggests that evidence of prior crimes should be admitted only at
the penalty phase and to admit such evidence at the guilt phase may
be unconstitutional.

See Model Penal Code §210.6 commentary at

144-45 (1980).
The State relies on Alabama and Oregon as states having
passed on this question.

While both states have statutes with

aggravating circumstances at the guilt phase similar to that in
question in this case,6 a review of the statutes of all fifty states
demonstrates that states allowing such evidence at the guilt phase
are a very small minority.

See Addendum B.

In addition, an even

greater distinction exists in that neither Alabama or Oregon has
statutory language recognizing prejudicial impact of prior

5

* The State relies on State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah
1985), for the proposition that M[e]vidence of prior crimes is
admissible if the evidence is relevant to prove a specific element
of the crime for which a defendant is on trial." Brief of
Respondent at 38. This quote from Pacheco, however, is dicta as the
Court also stated that ff[t]he evidence is not admissible if it is
relevant solely to show a defendant's propensity to commit crime."
Id. The Court then ultimately held in Pacheco that the admission of
the testimony in question has prejudicial error. Ij3. In any event,
reliance on Pacheco is unwarranted as it also fails to address the
constitutionality of the element in question.
6

* Notably, both the Alabama and Oregon statutes allow prior
convictions for murder only whereas the Utah Statute allows prior
convictions for murder and/or felonies involving violence.
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convictions as does Utah. Accordingly, the cases cited from those
jurisdictions are less persuasive than they might initially appear.
The State also asserts that Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554
(1967), condones the admission of prior convictions at the
guilt/innocence phase.

In Spencer v. Texas, supra, the United

States Supreme Court upheld convictions under Texas recidivist
statutes which provided harsher penalties for repeat offenders.
Under Texas law, jurors were informed of prior convictions at the
guilt/innocence phase.

Ironically, by the time the appeal reached

the Supreme Court, Texas had changed to a two-stage trial procedure;
however, the Supreme Court held that convictions under the old
procedure did not violate the constitutional guarantee of due
process.
Spencer v. Texas was decided in 1967 prior to Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) which re-opened the legitimacy of state
death penalty statutes struck down in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).

Gregg v. Georgia, supra, and its companion cases

emphasized the bifurcated trial process as the acceptable scheme to
obviate the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the earlier
deficient state statutes.

Subsequent cases further indicated that

because death as punishment is unique and irreversible, greater
procedural protections are required through all states of the
process.

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); accord State v.

Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983).
Spencer v. Texas, as "old" law, is unpersuasive in light of
the subsequent decisions in Furman v. Georgia, supra, and Gregg v.
Georgia, supra.

The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals

authored an opinion suggesting that Spencer v, Texas would not be
decided the same in a federal court.
F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1985),

United States v. Daniels, 770

That court stated that its opinion was

"guided but not controlled" by the Spencer v. Texas decision.

Id.

at 1116.
Similarly, with Utah's expressed position through
legislation, case law, and evidentiary rules, Spencer v. Texas is
not controlling in this case.

It would not be persuasive for Utah

to follow an opinion which addressed an underlying Texas law
directly at odds with the Utah law.

This fact is especially true

when Texas has since conformed their recidivist statutes questioned
in Spencer v. Texas

to be in line with Utah's habitual criminal

statute.
Furthermore, the Utah Constitution is more demanding than
that examined in Spencer v. Texas. Article I, Section 7, states
that "[n]o person shall be deprived to life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."

This Court has interpreted Utah's due

process clause to afford greater protections to the accused.

See

State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), (extending due process
protections to safeguard an accused from the refiling of criminal
charges already dismissed at a preliminary hearing) and State v.
Saunders, 699 p.2D 738, 742 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. McCumber,
622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980)).

(Recognizing due process is violated

when prejudicial evidence reaches the jury where severance would
have cured the prejudice).
When Utah's due process clause is coupled with Utah's
expansive version of the protection against cruel and unusual
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punishment set forth in Article I, Section 9 of the Utah
Constitution,^ the result should be to afford the greatest possible
protection to those who face the most severe punishment of death.
The State additionally argues that a limiting instruction
given to the jury could correct any potential prejudice.
Respondent at 42. Such a claim is without merit.

Brief of

The Model Penal

Code states:
Trial lawyers understandably have little
confidence in the intermediate solution of
admitting such evidence and trusting an
instruction to limit its consideration to
sentencing rather than guilt.
Model Penal Code 210.6 Commentary at 145 (1980).

Courts also have

recognized the futility of such a corrective instruction.

See

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968); United States v.
Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (1985); Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3rd Cir. 1976).
Finally, the State cites Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256,
1263 (10th Cir. 1986), in support of its argument that even if
subsection (h) is unconstitutional, "this Court should affirm the
conviction because of the presence of two other aggravating
factors."

Brief of Respondent at 43.

The aggravating circumstances challenged at the penalty
phase in Andrew v. Shulsen, supra, was "the killing for personal
gain."

Such an aggravating circumstance does not have the

capability of tainting the entire guilt phase of a trial as does
evidence of prior crimes.

'• See Article I, Section 9, Utah Constitution; State v. Bishop,
717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986) .
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Andrews v. Shulsen, supray also leaves room for an
unconstitutional finding of one aggravating circumstance which may
invalidate the others. The court states:
When one of the charged circumstances later
proves invalid or unsupported by the record,
however, the validity of the death sentence
"depends on the function of the jury's finding of
an aggravating circumstance under [the State's]
capital sentencing statute, and on the reasons
that the aggravating circumstance at issue in
[the] particular case was found to be invalid."
Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1263 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting in
part Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 864 (1983)).

The admission of

prior convictions into the guilt/innocence phase is highly
prejudicial.

The prejudice that subsection (h) introduced in the

guilt/innocence phase infected the total guilt finding process,
including the determination on the remaining aggravating
circumstances charged.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the conviction of
Mr. Gardner and order a new trial where prejudicial prior
convictions are not allowed to reach the jury.
POINT VII
(Reply to Respondent's Point VII)
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY NOT
GRANTING AN APPROPRIATE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE.
This Court should not hesitate to review the question as to
whether the trial court committed reversible error by not granting
an appropriate challenge for cause. Unlike the situation in State
v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986)(cited by the State) where
defense counsel made no objection, defense counsel objected
vigorously to Mr. Copinga (R. 1807-1809).
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Later in discussions

relating to juror challenges, both defense counsel and the trial
court indicated confusion as to the decision on Mr. Copinga (R.
1938).

Although in the midst of the confusion counsel ultimately

stated, ffI think what we will do is withdraw on Copinga", he had
already clearly delineated and recorded his objection.

In light of

the specifically outlined objection and the need for heightened
scrutiny as set forth in State v. Norton, supra, this issue should
be reviewed.
The totality of Mr. Copinga's voir dire indicates a
predisposition to impose a death sentence over life where one is
convicted of homicide. When asked by the court after a lengthy
statement regarding the guilt and penalty phase of a capital
homicide case whether he could return a life sentence, Mr. Copinga
responded, "If that's the only verdict" (R. 1408).

In light of Mr.

Copinga's voir dire response when reviewed as a whole, the trial
court committed reversible error in refusing to grant the defense
challenge for cause of Mr. Copinga.
POINT VIII
(Reply to Respondent's Point VIII)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING SECURITY GUARDS
TO SURROUND MR. GARDNER DURING THE TRIAL
In its response, the State concedes that the "method of
restraining the defendant was not a good practice."

(Respondent's

Brief at 47). The State claims, however, that this practice was not
inherently prejudicial to Mr. Gardner and that counsel for Mr.
Gardner should have requested to voir dire the jurors to determine
if they were influenced or biased by the presence of the guards.
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The State correctly notes that many courts have held that
the presence of security guards is not inherently prejudicial to
defendants.

The State seems to have misapprehended Mr. Gardner's

position. Appellant contends that not only was security excessive
but also that the actions of the guards in placing themselves
between Mr. Gardner and the jury was inherently prejudicial.
The major case that the State relies on is Holbrook v.
Flynn, 475 U.S.

, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986).

Holbrook stands for

the proposition that the presence of four uniformed state troopers
in a courtroom does not violate a defendant's constitutional right
to a fair trial. The facts in Holbrook are easily distinguishable
from those in the instant case. The Court in Holbrook stated, "If
they are placed at some distance from the accused, security officers
may well be perceived more as elements of an impressive drama than
as reminders of the defendant's special status." Holbrook, 89
L.Ed.2d at 525.

In the instant case the guards were not "placed at

some distance from the accused" but were placed between Mr. Gardner
and the jury and immediately jumped up to encircle Mr. Gardner
whenever a recess was taken.
The Court in Holbrook discussed the difference between the
number of guards at a trial and other practices by stating:
The chief feature that distinguishes the use of
identifiable security officers from courtroom
practices we might find inherently prejudicial is
the wider range of inferences that a juror might
reasonably draw from the officers' presence.
While shackling and prison clothes are
ummistakable indications of the need to separate
a defendant from the community at large, the
presence of guards at a defendant's trial need
not be interpreted as a sign that he is
particularly dangerous or culpable.
Id. at 534.

In the instant case, the fact the guards jumped up and
surrounded Mr. Gardner must have been interpreted as "a sign that he
is particularly dangerous or culpable."

The guards in this case did

much more than quietly sit in the spectator section of the courtroom
as had the guards in Holbrook.
In the instant case, the trial court by allowing the jury
to view Mr. Gardner as a threat and in continued custody,
effectively denied Mr. Gardner his right to have his guilt or
innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced
at trial.

See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978)(declaring

right of accused to have guilt or innocence determined solely on
basis of evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of
continued custody).
Many courts have held that excessive security in the form
of shackling is inherently prejudicial.

The instant case is more

like the shackling cases that Mr. Gardner cited in his opening brief
than the presence of security guard cases that the Respondent
cited.

By allowing the guards to surround Mr. Gardner at every

recess, the trial court allowed the impression that Mr. Gardner was
a violent person who needed to be closely guarded.
In Commonwealth v. DeVasto, 387 N.E.2d 1173 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979), a conviction for assault and battery upon a correctional
officer was reversed because the defendant was forced to remain
handcuffed and guarded by uniformed correctional officers during his
trial.

ff

[A] judge who contemplates approving such measures should

state his reasons (including recommendations received from the
custodial authority) in the presence of counsel and [the] defendant,
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and out of the presence of veniremen or jury, and provide an
opportunity for counsel to make their objection known."

Id. at

1171, quoting (Commonwealth v, Brown, 305 N.E.2d 830, 836 (1973)).
Brown also stated that "the least drastic and conspicuous measures
reasonably available that meet the particular need should be
employed."

Commonwealth v. Brown, 305 N.E.2d at 836.

In the present case, the trial court did not state its
reasons on the record for allowing this highly prejudicial
practice.

Nor did the trial court "provide an opportunity for

counsel to make their objection known" prior to trial. Finally, the
practice allowed by the trial court did not meet "the least drastic
and conspicuous measures reasonable available" test found in Brown.
The State contends that the problem of the actions of the
guards was cured at the second day of trial and since "the trial
lasted several days it is likely that the jury forgot witnessing any
restraint of defendant by the guards."
47).

(Brief of Respondent at

The State cites no cases to support this proposition.

The

Appellant made his motion for a mistrial just prior to the lunch
recess on October 16. The trial started October 15 and both sides
rested on October 18. Trial resumed October 22 with closing
argument and a verdict being reached.

Thus, this was not such a

long trial that the jury would have forgotten what happened on the
first day and a half.

In a similar situation a court reasoned that,

"It may be doubted whether any jury, even with the best of
cautionary instructions, can ever dismiss from its mind that the
accused has appeared before it in handcuffs or chains. His being
restrained must carry obvious implications even to the most
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fair-minded of juries."

State v, Roberts, 206 A.2d 200, 205 (N.J.

Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965).

The same principle applies in the

instant case in that the actions of the guards were such that the
relief granted by the trial court did not erase the action from the
minds of the jurors. And while the trial court did grant some
future relief, defense counsel in no way withdrew their motion for a
mistrial based on what had already occurred (R. 2170).
Finally the State contends that the Appellant should have
requested to voir dire the jurors to determine if they were
influenced or prejudiced by the security guards.

In discussing the

issue of whether to voir dire a jury in the context of the effect of
a newscast this court stated:
In refusing to poll the jury,the district court
suggested that to question the jurors
individually concerning the broadcast may have
created more suspicion and prejudice against the
defendant than it prevented. We agree.
State v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528, 553 (Utah 1983).
By conducting a voir dire of the jurors the Appellant might
very well have created "more suspicion and prejudice than it
prevented."
Furthermore in Holbrook v. Flynn, supra, the United States
Supreme Court said:
Whenever a courtroom arrangement is challenged as
inherently prejudicial, therefore, the question
must be not whether jurors actually articulated a
consciousness of some prejudicial effect, but
rather whether "an unacceptable risk is presented
of impermissible factors coming into play."
89 L.Ed.2d at 535 (citations omitted).

Therefore even if the jurors

had been voir dired their responses would not be dispositive.
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In this case, there was "an unacceptable risk presented of
impermissible factors11 playing a part in the jury's decision*

The

practice of surrounding Mr. Gardner at each recess goes beyond not
being a good practice as the State contends. This practice in a
capital case involving an escape from custody and extensive
pre-trial publicity regarding the violent nature of the defendant is
inherently prejudicial.

By placing guards between Mr. Gardner and

the jury, the trial court allowed a practice which must have led the
jury to conclude that Mr. Gardner was a threat to them.

In fact,

after the jury reached its verdict, the judge asked whether any of
the jurors wanted to be accompanied to their cars and some responded
affirmatively (R. 2602).

Mr. Gardner therefore deserves a new trial

where the only evidence the jury is allowed to consider comes from
the witness stand and not from a courtroom atmosphere which breeds
fear and prejudice against the defendant.
POINT X
(Reply to Respondent's Point X)
THE TESTIMONY OF OFFICER JORGENSEN SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN PERMITTED SINCE THE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF MR. GARDNER'S FIFTH AND SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR THE
IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION.
The State does not argue that Mr. Jorgensen's testimony
would have been admissible in the State's case-in-chief and seems to
accept Mr. Gardner's position that admission of such testimony in
the case-in-chief would have violated Mr. Gardner's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights (See Brief of Respondent at 51-52).

The State,

however, claims the testimony is subject to the impeachment
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exception and thus admissible in rebuttal.

See Walder v. United

States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954), Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971), Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 298, 307 (1984) Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 307 (1984).

While the United States Supreme Court has

not applied the impeachment exception to evidence admitted in
violation of the Sixth Amendment, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit has done so in United States v. McManaman, 606
F.2d 919, 924, 25 (10th Cir. 1979).
Where the impeachment exception has been applied, the
appellate court, however, acknowledged two factors that make
otherwise inadmissible testimony admissible as impeachment. First,
the testimony must be offered to rebut the defendant's own
testimony.

Walder at 64, Hass at 577, Elstad at 231, United States

v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980).

The second element

consistently present in each of these cases was an instruction by
the judge to the jury explaining that the rebuttal testimony was to
be "considered only in passing on petitioner's credibility and not
as evidence of guilt."

Harris at 223. See also Walder at 64, Hass

at 717. Elstad did not deal specifically with the question of
impeachment and only discussed the impeachment exception in broad
terms.

McManaman also included a jury instruction on the proper use

of impeachment testimony.

606 F.2d 919, 924.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has said that a cautionary instruction is clearly required when
otherwise inadmissible testimony is admitted as impeachment. United
States v. Sisto, 543 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1976).

In United States v.

Lester, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
said "under this circuit's established rule, it is obvious that the
"
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District Court's failure to advise the jury that Bevin's prior
inconsistent statement could be received only for impeachment
purposes and not for substantive proof of appellant Lester's crime
was plain error affecting substantial rights."

491 F.2d 680, 683.

Because no such instruction was given in Mr. Gardner's
case, either at the time of the testimony (R. 2481-2497) or during
the jury instructions (R. 544-596), the jury was not aware that it
was to treat Officer Jorgensen's testimony as impeachment or that
the officer's testimony was not to be used as substantive proof of
Mr. Gardner's guilt or innocence. As a result, it is very likely
the jury treated the testimony as substantive evidence.8
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that failure to give
cautionary instructions sua sponte is reversible error when the
failure denies the defendant a fair trial.
P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984).

State v. Shabata, 678

The Court went on to say "the

application of this rule is especially appropriate where the
instructions that were given generally covered the subject matter."
Id.

In Mr. Gardner's case, no instructions were given to the jury

explaining the difference between evidence used for impeachment and
evidence used to determine substantive guilt or innocence.

(R.

544-596).

**• As pointed out in Mccormick on Evidence, p.513: "As a practical
matter, it seems unlikely that jurors would be either inclined or
able to make this distinction [between considering the testimony
only as bearing upon the accused credibility as a witness and not as
tending to prove the accused's guilt of the crime charged.] " . . .
[i]t is unrealistic to conclude that the testimony will be
considered only for purposes of credibility evaluation."
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More importantly, Officer Jorgensen's testimony was the
only testimony which indicated that Mr. Gardner knowingly shot
Michael Burdell.

See Appellant's Brief at 79. As a result,

admission of the testimony without an instruction was clearly a
factor in jury's resulting decision to find Mr. Gardner guilty of
intentional murder.

This specific injury combined with the broader

consideration given capital cases should prompt this court to find
that the admission of Officer Jorgensen's testimony which was taken
in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and the failure of the Court to instruct the jury on
the proper consideration of Officer Jorgensen's testimony was
manifest and prejudicial error requiring reversal of Mr. Gardner's
convictions.
POINT XI
(Reply to Respondent's Brief Point XI)
THE TRIAL COURT'S INCORRECT DEFINITION OF MANSLAUGHTER
IN JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 21 PRECLUDED JURY CONSIDERATION
OF THE EXTREME DISTURBANCE MANSLAUGHTER THEORY OF THE
CASE.
The State concedes that Mr. Gardner was entitled to a jury
instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter.

The

State's position is that Instruction No. 34 (Addendum S in
Appellant's opening brief), which the court gave instead of
defendant's proferred Instruction No. 21 (Addendum R in Appellant's
opening brief), correctly defines the extreme disturbance variety of
manslaughter.

Although the State raises several contentions in this

regard, most are adequately addressed in Mr. Gardner's opening
brief.

Appellant's reply on this point will be limited specifically

to Respondent's contention that he has misread the language and
intent of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205(1)(b) (1953 as amended 1975).

The State acknowledges the extraordinary breadth of the
manslaughter statute Utah adopted from the Model Penal Code (MPC) in
1973, but argues that amendments to the statute show that Utah's
statute at the relevant time was far narrower in its scope than its
MPC antecedent.
Although the legislative history is somewhat ambiguous, it
cannot honestly be interpreted to support Respondent's contention.
In the State's view, the statute as adopted in 1973 consisted of
distinct objective and subjective parts.9

The allegedly subjective

part, subsection 2 of the 1973 statute, was deleted in 1975. Thus
respondent reasons that the statute set up a purely objective test
after 1975.
This is incorrect.

Section 76-5-205 is a careful fusion of

objective and subjective considerations; the standard thus created
was unaffected by the 1975 deletion of the language in former
subpoint 2.

The plain language of the statute after 1975 still

required the factfinder to determine whether an accused's
explanation for his extreme mental or emotional disturbance was
reasonable.

The question between 1973 and 1975 was, "is it

reasonable that the accused was disturbed?"

9*

The 1975 deletion of

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:

. . .

(b) Causes the death of another under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse;
(2) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse of the actor
. . . shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
actor's situation under the circumstances as he believed them to
be. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1973).
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some statutory language did not alter the question to "would a
reasonable man have been disturbed?"

The subjective element of the

statute was unaltered by the 1975 amendment.
Section 76-5-205 was amended a second time in 1985.10

This

time, the legislature added language to the statute specifically
requiring the reasonableness of the accused's explanation or excuse
to be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the
then existing circumstances. Applying the amended statute in the
present case would have led to a formulation something like this:
"Would a reasonable borderline mentally retarded person who is in
shackles and has just been handed a gun reasonably find himself
under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance if he were
shot in the shoulder?"

In other words, the question under the 1985

amendment remains "Is it reasonable that the accused was
disturbed?"
The 1985 amendment was not in effect on April 2, 1985.
However, Respondent argues that it elucidates §76-5-205 for the
court's purposes in this case because it "merely clarif[ies] the
limitations to the manslaughter mitigation which the legislature

1°*

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:

. . .

(b) Causes the death of another under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse;

(2) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse . . . shall
be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the
then existing circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (Supp. 1985).

intended when it removed the subjective element in 1975."
Respondent's Brief at 55.
Respondent's position is refuted by the comments of the
1985 amendment's sponsor, Representative Lyle Hillyard.
The reasonableness of the explanation or excuse
would be based on the viewpoint of a reasonable
person under the then-existing circumstances, so
we've gone to an objective standard rather than a
subjective standard in these tests . . .
State of Rep. Lyle Hillyard, Utah State Legislature, S.B.
127, disc. 50 (February 5, 1985) (Emphasis added).
The Representative's remark indicates that his amendment was a
modification rather than a clarification of the statute.
In summary, the language of §76-5-205 and its legislative
history support the position that the statute was as broad in its
scope as its MPC antecedent on April 2, 1985.
In regard to this interpretation of §76-5-205, the State
attacks Mr. Gardner's reliance on State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298
(1976).

The relevant issue in Gaxiola was whether the court's

definitions of certain words in §76-5-205 had arbitrarily limited
the nature of the antecedent circumstances that may justify
mitigation.

The court held that the definitions given had not

achieved this indisputably improper end.
The importance of Gaxiola for Mr. Gardner is that even
after the 1975 amendment of §76-5-205, this Court cited with
approval from the Model Penal Code Commentary to then Section
201.3.

Gaxiola refutes the State's hypothesis of §76-5-205's sharp

divergence from the MPC in 1975.
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For the reasons stated here and in Appellant's opening
brief, the court's instruction on extreme disturbance manslaughter
incorrectly defined that offense and precluded jury consideration of
this theory of the case*
POINT XII
(Reply to Respondent's Point XII)
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED AFTER UNANIMOUSLY FINDING
THAT MR. GARDNER DID NOT COMMIT FIRST DEGREE HOMICIDE,
In State v. Clayton/ 658 P.2d 624 (Utah 1983)/ a case
involving a charge of attempted murder, the district court
instructed the jury "that if they were not satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the offense of
intentionally and knowingly attempting to cause the death of Edward
Long, they might find the defendant guilty of any lesser included
offense whose commission was necessarily included in the offense
charged." Jj3. at 627 n.2.
The instruction in Clayton seems only to indicate that
the jury was to consider the lesser included offenses if they were
not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the charged offense.
The instruction given by the trial court in the instant case was
quite different.

The trial court in Mr. Gardner's case instructed

the jury that before they could even consider any lesser included
offense they must unanimously find that the defendant did not commit
first-degree homicide.

This instruction did much more than "direct

the jury to begin by determining whether the defendant was guilty of
the charged offense." ^Id. at 627. The instruction in the instant
case forbade the jury from even considering a lesser offense until
unanimously agreeing on first-degree homicide.

Another important difference in the present case is that
the instruction was a verbal sua sponte instruction*

Rule 19 of the

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the parties be
furnished with copies of proposed instructions unless they stipulate
otherwise.
Rule 19(a) states:
The court shall inform counsel of its proposed
action upon the request; and it shall furnish
counsel with a copy of its proposed
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that
such instructions may be given orally, or
otherwise waive this requirement.
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-19(a) (1953 as amended).
In the present case, there is no evidence that the
parties were informed of the proposed _sua sponte instruction,
stipulated that it could be given orally or that Mr. Gardner waived
the requirement that he be furnished with a written copy of the
proposed instruction.

Thus, the sua sponte instruction was given in

violation of Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Because appellate review of capital cases merits a
heightened scrutiny in reviewing the record for "manifest and
prejudicial" error, (State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983)
(citing State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982)).

See also

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287 (1976)), this Court should look beyond
Clayton and not allow Mr. Gardner's conviction to be based on a
verbal sua sponte instruction.

In a case involving questions of

intent and mental state, it was prejudicial error for the trial
court to foreclose the jury from considering lesser degrees of
homicide.
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POINT XIV
(Reply to Respondent's Point XIV)
MR. GARDNER WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL DUE
TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
Contrary to the State's contention, the record is clear
that the prosecution laughed during the questioning of Mr. Gardner's
brother.

The following occurred during the questioning of Mr.

Gardner's brother:
Q:

Is he capable of emotion?

A: Yes.
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: Your Honor, I am going to
object to this laughing when I question witnesses
and the snickering on the part of the
prosecution. I think that is unprofessional.
THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: And I would like the record
to reflect that they are doing that, and my
client is on trial for his life.
THE COURT: All right. That's enough argument.
The record may so show.
THE WITNESS:

It is nothing to laugh at.

(R. 2771).
The State's position that because the trial judge did not
consider the laughter prejudicial that this Court should rule
likewise is without merit.

(Brief of Respondent at 66) This Court

in State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) reversed an arson
conviction even though the trial court had not found the
prosecutor's actions worthy of a mistrial.
The State's argument in regard to the reading of the
medical reports is that since they were read during the
cross-examination of Dr. Heinbecker the same could be read during
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closing argument.

While Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

might have allowed these statements in Dr. Heinbecker's
cross-examination no rule allows the prosecution to read from these
reports not in evidence during closing argument.
The final area of prosecutorial misconduct concerns the
prosecutor's use of escape evidence.

The appellant argues that

there was no evidence that he had ever escaped from maximum
security.

In State v. Busby, 464 So. 2d 262, 267 (La. 1985) the

court stated, "The prosecutor's remarks about societal cost of a
life sentence, misspent tax dollar, future escapes, more killing by
defendant, were improper."

Perhaps the most egregious instance of

misconduct occurred in the questioning of Dennis Fuchs, Chairman of
the Utah Board of Pardons. Mr. Fuchs was called by Appellant and
questioned about procedures of parole hearings for people convicted
of First Degree Murder.

On cross-examination the prosecutor

questioned Mr. Fuchs about three individuals who had been convicted
of First Degree Murder and had escaped from prison (R. 2827-29).
This questioning went well beyond direct questioning and was
extremely prejudicial.

The whole issue during the penalty phase of

the trial was whether to put Mr. Gardner in prison or kill him.
When the jury was told that no prison could hold Mr. Gardner and
that other similarly situated inmates had escaped, its verdict was a
foregone conclusion.

This questioning clearly violated the tenets

of Troy and resulted in an unreliable verdict.

The fact that

defense counsel did not object to the cross-examination of Mr. Fuchs
is irrelevant because as this Court stated in State v. Wood, 648
P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982).

"On direct appeal in capital cases, it is
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the established rule that this Court will review an error, even
though no proper objection was made at trial and even though the
error was not raised on appeal, if the error was manifest and
prejudicial."
When viewed individually, and especially when viewed
collectively, the incidents of prosecutorial misconduct in this case
very probably influenced the jury and accordingly Mr. Gardner should
be given a new trial free from these abuses.
POINT XVI
(Reply to Respondent's Point XVI)
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED
TO ALLOW THE JURY TO RECEIVE TWO PIECES OF RELEVANT
MITIGATING EVIDENCE.
In Hitchcock v. Dugger, 85-6756, 41 Crim. L. Rep. 3071
(decided April 22, 1987) the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
earlier opinions that "the sentencer may not refuse to consider or
be precluded from considering 'any relevant mitigating evidence.'"
Id. at 3071 (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S.

,

(1986) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)).

The

Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred by narrowly
interpreting the statute and invalidated the death sentence which
had been imposed.
In the case at bar, the trial judge similarly abused his
discretion by interpreting the statute so narrowly as to prevent the
proffered mitigating evidence from being heard by the jury. This
abuse of discretion is especially clear when recognizing that Utah's
statute is broader than that examined in Hitchcock v. Dugger, supra
in that it is open ended, allowing any other fact in mitigation to
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be presented to the jury.

The Utah statute, Utah Code Ann.

§76-3-207(2), states:
(2) In these sentencing proceedings,
evidence may be presented as to any matter the
court deems relevant to sentence, including but
not limited to the nature and circumstances of
the crime, the defendant's character, background,
history, mental and physical condition, and any
other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the
penalty. Any evidence the court deems to have
probative force may be received regardless of its
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence. The state's attorney and the defendant
shall be permitted to present argument for or
against sentence of death. Aggravating
circumstances shall include those as outlined in
76-5-202.
(Emphasis added).
The rationale behind the introduction of the affidavits is
two-fold:

First, the affidavits are relevant because the jury must

determine that the death penalty is justified and appropriate. A
competent review of Mr. Gardner's crime in relation to penalty
deserved is functionally impossible without a comparison or backdrop
of other capital cases. Without such a backdrop, any first degree
murder conviction could arbitrarily be found to merit the death
penalty by any random jury.

The jury needs to know the sentence

imposed in other cases to make a fair and impartial determination of
proper penalty.
Second, the actual jury sentencing Mr. Gardner was exposed
to some information of other homicide cases and sentences received.
At least half of the actual jurors discussed other capital cases
during voir dire indicating capital defendants who received the
death penalty:

Bundy, Bishop, Gilmore, Franklin, and Lance and

Kelbach, among others (R. 1441, 1506, 1510-11, 1738, 1739, 1833).
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This information, in part, was erroneous or misguided and could have
thwarted a fair determination of the appropriate sentence for Mr.
Gardner.

The proffered affidavits would have supplied the correct

and true data to have insured a fair determination.

Accordingly,

the affidavits were relevant and the court abused its discretion in
refusing to permit the jury to review them.
The State argues that this Court should narrowly interpret
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-207(2) and not allow the affidavits as evidence
in mitigation.

The State contends that the affidavits are not

relevant and do not address the nature of Mr. Gardner's crime. Such
a narrow construction of the broader language in the statute is
unacceptable in a capital case which requires that statutes not be
given a strict construction, and that the accused be given the
benefit of any information which may mitigate against receiving the
death penalty.

Any information which does so mitigate becomes

relevant to the defendant and his crime.
The State cites Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81, 93 (Utah
1983) ("Andrews v. Morris 11"), for the proposition that only the
defendant and his crimes should be examined.
72.

Brief of Respondent at

This reference from Andrews v. Morris II, however, is taken out

of context. Andrews v. Morris II addresses the question of the
retroactivity of State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), to cases
finalized before the Wood decision.

As such, the quote utilized by

the State is unpersuasive when discussing the relevance of
mitigating circumstances.
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The State also cites Andrews v. Morris/ 607 P.2d 816, 805
(Utah 1980) ("Andrews v. Morris I") to support their position.
Brief of Respondent at 73. Andrews v. Morris I, while more on
point, takes a broader look than that now requested by Mr. Gardner.
Andrews v. Morris I examines the entire system and the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty.

The court adopted language from

Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert,
denied 440 U.S. 976 (1979), wherein a statute was challenged as
being administered "impermissibly and discriminatorily by
prosecutors in the plea bargaining process against defendants
convicted of murdering whites as opposed to blacks, and against
males and poor persons." Andrews v. Morris I at 825. Mr. Gardner's
focus is more narrow; he requests only that the jury be permitted to
view ten affidavits of prior capital cases as a backdrop to deciding
his fate.
Furthermore, in Andrews v. Morris I only one other justice
joined Justice Hall in the opinion.

The opinion is therefore a

plurality opinion, not a majority opinion, and Mr. Gardner
respectfully requests that this Court reconsider the earlier
position.

Mr. Gardner contends that the more expansive language of

Utah's Article I, Section 9 than its federal counterpart must be
interpreted to allow the jury to view mitigating evidence such as
the affidavits to avoid treating an individual with unnecessary
rigor. Without such information the jury is without a meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which the death penalty is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.

See Furman v.

Georgia, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
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The rationale behind the relevancy of the proferred
testimony of Kay Henry and other close friends and religious
colleagues of Mr. Burdell is similar to the rationale for allowing
the jury to review the affidavits.

The broad language of the

statute allows for any mitigating evidence, including the testimony
that Mr. Burdell was opposed to Capital Punishment and would not
have wanted Mr. Gardner to be executed.
The State cites Booth v. Maryland, 86-5020, 41 Crim. L.
Rep. (decided June 15, 1987), as controlling the question of the
proffered testimony of victims —

or their friends or family.

However, Booth v. Maryland addressed the question of a Victim Impact
Statement as an aggravating circumstance not a mitigating
circumstance.

The two are intrinsically distinct in operation.

Aggravating circumstances operate to narrow the class of those
eligible for the death penalty [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 513
(1976)], while mitigating circumstances allow states to provide
individualized considerations for the capital defendant to mitigate
against the imposition of the death penalty.

See generally, Woodson

v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
In Booth v. Maryland, supra, the Supreme Court in its
holding demonstrated the significant distinction between the
aggravating and mitigating circumstance and philosophy.

The Court

stated, "[the] admission [of victim impact statements] creates a
constitutionally inacceptable risk that the jury may impose the
death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.11

IjA. at 3283.

That concern and finding by the Court is only a concern with
aggravating circumstances.
mitigating circumstances.

Such a concern is not present with

Accordingly, the proffered testimony that Mr. Burdell was
opposed to capital punishment is constitutionally permissible and
demanded by the language of the statute.

The trial court abused its

discretion in refusing to allow the testimony to reach the jury,
thereby preventing the jury from reaching a sentencing decision
based on all the evidence.

Mr. Gardner respectfully requests that

this Court vacate the sentence imposed and order a new sentencing
hearing where all mitigating evidence is allowed to reach the jury.
POINT XVII
(Reply to Respondent's Point XVII)
UTAH STATUTE AND CONSTITUTION ESTABLISH THAT
IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THIS CASE IS
ARBITRARY AND DISPROPORTIONATE WITH OTHER
DEATH PENALTY CASES.
While the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution does not require appellate courts to conduct a case
comparative proportionality review when reviewing death penalty
cases (See Pulley v. Harris, 466 U.S. 37 (1984)), Article I, Section
9 of the Utah Constitution is not so limited.

Article I, Section 9

provides:
Sec. 9. Excessive bail shall not be required;
excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted.
Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be
treated with unnecessary rigor. (Emphasis added).
While this provision has not been interpreted in the
context of whether it requires a comparison with other potential
death penalty cases to establish that the punishment is not
unnecessarily rigorous, the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that
the Utah Constitutional provision is broader than the federal
protection based on the last sentence in the article.

See State v.

Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986).

This broader protection against

cruel and unusual punishment, and punishment imposed without
unnecessary rigor, requires a comparative case review on appeal of a
death sentence "to avoid arbitrariness and to assure
proportionality."

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).

In addition to the constitutional requirement, Utah Code
Ann. §76-1-104 (1953 as amended) specifically provides for appellate
case comparison.

(See Appellant's Brief at 137 for text of statute).

Section (3) of the statute expressly requires the
sentencing body, when imposing a penalty, to consider differences in
the rehabilitation possibilities among individual defendants. The
requirement may be satisfied only if a system of review is employed
which compares the facts and circumstances of the case reviewed with
the circumstances and penalties imposed in other cases within the
jurisdiction for which a defendant has been convicted of a similar
offense.
The State contends that this Court had the opportunity to
interpret §76-1-104 in the cases of Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81
(Utah 1983) and State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982).

(State's

brief at 82). However, the issue as to whether §76-1-104(3) and (4)
mandates appellate case comparison was not before the Court in
either case and was not addressed by this Court. Mr. Gardner should
not be denied judicial interpretation of this statute simply because
the Court could have, on its own motion, addressed the issue in
prior cases.
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Furthermore, the state misinterprets this Court's decision
in State v. Wood, supra, when it argues that this Court held that
the sentencing body must not look at other death penalty cases but
must consider only the circumstances of the particular crime charged
to the defendant and the background and personal characteristics of
the defendant (State's brief at 82). Nowhere in the opinion does
the Court indicate that a comparison with other death penalty cases
may or must not be made when determining the proportionality of the
penalty.

On the contrary, the language in Wood suggests the

opposite.

This Court indicated that not only should the

circumstances of the particular offense and characteristics of the
defendant be considered, but the sentencing body must also consider
the defendant's culpability as compared with the culpability of
defendants convicted of a similar offense.

The Wood Court stated:

Although the Eighth Amendment does not deprive
. . the State of the power to impose the death
penalty for those who commit murder, it does
require recognition of the fact that even among
murderers there are those who are less culpable
than others and that the death penalty is not
appropriate in all cases. Therefore, the
standards which guide the sentencing body must
focus on the circumstances as well as the
background and personal characteristics of the
defendant. (Emphasis added).
Wood, 648 P.2d at 77. Mr. Gardner agrees that the language clearly
suggests that a sentencing body must consider the circumstances of
the particular offense and the characteristics of the defendant but
in addition, this must be compared with the circumstances and
characteristics of others convicted of the same offense.

To neglect

the latter is to prevent the reviewing body from determining
differences in culpability among individual defendants.
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The only

method to determine those individuals who are most culpable and for
whom the death penalty is appropriate is an intercase review and
comparison of Mr. Gardner's case with those Utah cases in which the
defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
death and those convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

This

system of review, is routinely used by the United States Supreme
Court when reviewing death penalty cases (Appellant's Brief footnote
20 at 140).
Finally, the State argues that this Court rejected a case
by comparison as a system of death penalty review in Andrews v.
Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980), cert denied, 499 U.S. 891 (1980)
and again in Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983) and
therefore it is unnecessary for this Court to address Mr. Gardner's
argument that the death penalty is disproportionate to his crime
(State's Brief at 82). Mr. Gardner contends that Andrews is
inapplicable to Mr. Gardner's appeal. Andrews was a habeas corpus
proceeding brought by the defendant to challenge his death sentence
on the grounds that it was imposed arbitrarily and as a result of
racial discrimination.

The Court's refusal to adopt a case by case

comparison and its holding in Andrews is narrow in its
application—applying only to claims of racial discrimination in the
imposition of the death penalty.

Id. at 98. Andrews did not

involve a claim of disproportionality under Utah Statute §76-1-104
of the Utah Constitution.

In addition, the Court in Andrews based

its decision on the fact that Andrews failed to substantiate his
claim that the death penalty was imposed arbitrarily with
information regarding the facts and circumstances of other cases in
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which a defendant convicted of first degree murder should have, but
did not receive the death penalty. Jjd. at 97. Mr. Gardner in his
opening brief clearly provides information including facts and
circumstances of other cases which demonstrate that the sentence of
death was disproportionately applied.

(Appellant's brief at

142-146).
In addition to a comparison with the cases outlined in
Appellant's opening brief, the fact that Mr. Gardner's death penalty
sentence is excessive and disproportionate is evident when compared
with the facts and circumstances of the Hofmann case. Mark Hofmann
committed an extremely heinous crime for which he was charged with
two counts of first degree murder arising out of the bombing deaths
of two individuals. Unlike Mr. Gardner who, while suffering the
effects of a bullet wound to his shoulder, reflexively shot his
victim, Mr. Hofmann calculatedly plotted the murders of both of his
victims.

Furthermore, Hofmann created grave risk of death to people

other than his victims, carried out his murders by using elaborate
bombs which he fabricated over a period of time prior to his
commission of the crime and committed the offense in furthering an
elaborate forgery scheme for pecuniary gain. All of these
aggravating circumstances were incident to one criminal episode.
In contrast, of the aggravating circumstances which
elevated Mr. Gardner's offense to the level of a capital offense,
only the creation of risk of death to persons other than the victim
and the commission of the offense for the purpose of escaping from
custody were related to the death of Mr. Burdell.

The third

aggravating circumstance attributed to Mr. Gardner, the fact that he
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had a prior conviction for a violent felony bears no relationship to
the offense for which he was sentenced to die (See Point VI in
Appellant's opening and reply briefs).
On January 7, 1987, Mark Hofmann entered into a plea
agreement with the state. The terms of the agreement permitted Mr.
Hofmann to plead guilty to two counts of second degree murder. As
the result of that agreement Mr. Hofmann became no longer eligible
for the death penalty irrespective of the atrocious nature of his
crimes.
It would be inherently unjust to permit Mr. Gardner's death
sentence to stand in light of the heinous crimes committed and the
outcome of the Hofmann case, and in comparison to other homicide
cases in this state where the death penalty was not ultimately
imposed.

(See Appellant's Brief at 144-146).

This Court should, in

compliance with Utah State §76-1-104 (as amended), and Article I,
Section Nine of the Utah Constitution, adopt a case comparative
system of review.

In comparing Mr. Gardner's offense and penalty

with other first degree murder cases, including the Hofmann case,
this Court should find that the death penalty has been applied
arbitrarily and disproportionately in this case.

CONCLUSION
The errors complained of in this brief affected trial and
penalty phase proceedings.
With respect to the errors claimed to have occurred prior
to trial and at trial, Appellant, Ronnie Lee Gardner, seeks reversal
of his convictions and remand of his case to the district court for
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dismissal of the first degree homicide charge and/or a new trial.
With respect to the errors concerning the penalty phase, Appellant
requests reversal of his sentence of death and remand to the
district court with either an order imposing a sentence of life or
an order for a new penalty phase proceeding.
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ADDENDUM A

ADDENDUM A

1. Mr. Varoz (R. 1479-1491) in recalling the facts stated
"The defendant was handed a handgun by a woman accomplice, and the
defendant sought to escape.

In the process of escaping he fired a

gun several times, and as a result, one man was killed, hit in the
head and killed.
wounded himself."

Another man was wounded.
(R. 1480).

The defendant was

Later, Mr.Varoz added that he had

accepted the reports in the news media as being factual and that
based on these reports "I would say that he is guilty of doing it."
(R. 1486-1487).
2.

Mrs. Carsey (R. 1491-1501) said she received most of

her information regarding the case discussing it with another juror
(R. 1491).

She also said that she initially had the opinion that

Mr. Gardner was guilty and that she had made the comment, "Well, if
he is guilty, why the trial?" However, she said after thinking
about her comment she was able to answer her own question.
3. Mr. Jaffa (R. 1513-1526) made the statement regarding
Mr. Gardner that "I would say someone was shot and he [Gardner]
probably pulled the trigger."
4.

(R. 1518).

Mrs. Olson (R. 1527-1539) had discussed the

investigation of the case with an investigating officer, her
brother-in-law, Lt. Anjewierden.

And though he had not expressed

his opinion to her she stated she could presume that his opinion
would be one of guilt.
5.

Mr. Phillips (R. 1558-1567) stated he had heard Gardner

in trying to escape had shot a lawyer who had later died.

6.

Mr. Adamson (R. 1600-1611) had discussed the case with

a number of his associates. During those discussions Mr. Adamson
was subjected to the opinions that Gardner "deserves what he gets,"
and, from some, that the death penalty should prevail.
7.

(R. 1607).

Dr. Haynes (R. 1611-1624) stated he had a tendency to

believe what he reads in the paper or heard on the television and
that his initial reaction was "I think I believed he [Mr. Gardner]
was guilty at that time."

(R. 1619).

Dr. Haynes was also aware

that Mr. Gardner had a prior criminal record and was in court the
day of the shooting regarding a prior criminal action.
8.

Mr. Holt (R. 1636-1647) said he recalled that Gardner

was a convicted felon. He had also discussed the case with various
family and friends that had stated their opinion was "let's get it
over with/1 meaning "Let's kill him [Gardner] on the spot."

(R.

1645)
9.

Mr. Ashment (R. 1647-1665), on the day of the

courthouse shooting, stated he was across the street and walked over
to investigate what was happening.

While there, an officer had told

him that Mr. Gardner had escaped and was armed and dangerous. He
was dismissed for cause.
10.

Mrs. Barker (R. 1712-1721) stated the incident at the

courthouse was "kind of scary" as she lived in the area. Mrs.
Barker had also discussed the case with various acquaintances and
had been subjected to the opinions that what had happened was very
cruel and that many people had told her she should feel very
uncomfortable being on the Gardner jury (R. 1719-1720).

11.

Mr. Kelly (R. 1773-1793) stated he thought Gardner's

lawyers were not contending that he had not committed the crime but
that perhaps he may have dreamed this as "this thing really is
affecting all of us."

(R. 1773-1774).

Mr. Kelly had also discussed

the incident with the Channel 4 News reporter who was covering the
incident in the courthouse.

Further, Mr. Kelly had discussed the

case with a friend who felt that the police department should be
given more time on the shooting range because then Gardner would be
dead and the case would never have reached trial (R. 1785).
12.

Mrs. Horman (R. 1834-1840) stated the more she thought

about the case the more she was impressed that Mr. Gardner was
guilty and that she would have a hard time setting that opinion
aside (R. 1840).
13.

She was excused.

Mrs. Sperry (R. 1840-1849) admitted that as she knew

some of Mr. Gardner's history she would have a hard time being as
impartial as she had originally indicated (R. 1847).

She stated/1 I

would like to say, Yes, I could be totally impartial, but I have
found over the course of the last few days that I don't think I am
as impartial."
14.

(R. 1848).

She was excused.

Mrs. Swenson (R. 1858-1865) who during the group voir

dire stated she had no opinion remembered the incident, stating "I
saw it on TV two, three times, maybe a dozen times."

(R. 1859). She

also made the statement when asked if she could balance the
aggravating with the mitigating circumstances that "I would not vote
for life, just death."

(R. 1865).

She was excused.

15.

Mrs. Carruthers {R. 1865-1882) who during group voir

dire stated she had no opinions, stated that she believed of a
defendant was "already in jail for killing somebody, then this time
the sentence would be the death sentence."

(R. 1874). However, she

did state she was not sure what the facts of the Gardner case were
regarding prior convictions.
16.

Mr. Evans (R. 1900-1911) stated his reaction to the

courthouse shooting was one of abhorrence to the entire
circumstance.

He also stated his initial opinion as "Based on the

information I had heard, presuming it was true, my opinion is that
he [Gardner] did attempt to escape and in doing so he did shoot and
kill an individual and wounded another."
17.

(R. 1909).

Mrs. Talbot (R. 1911-1922), when asked what her

initial opinion was stated, "At the time I probably had a feeling of
guilt."

(R. 1919).
18.

Mr. Baker (R. 1922-1935) said at the onset "I formed

the opinion that he [Gardner] shot the attorney and the police
officer."

(R. 1931). He had also discussed the incident with

various acquaintances, and together they agreed that Mr. Gardner
should receive the death penalty.

(R. 1931-1932).

Mr. Baker also

stated, "I haven't put it [his opinion] aside as of yet. I will wait
and look at the evidence and see what is put forth."
19.

(R. 1934).

Mr. Ricks (R. 1373-1379) stated "based on the reports

and in the media, I felt that he [Gardner] was probably guilty."
(R. 1376).

20.

Mr. Harwood (R. 1379-1385) stated that his initial

reaction was that the incident was a horrible thing and that "he
[Gardner] was guilty."

(R 1383).

He also believed that Gardner

would have to bring forward some evidence in order to change his
mind about that particular view. He was later excused.
21.

Mrs. Jensen-Yates (R. 1385-1393) had discussed the

case with her sister-in-law and co-workers who were of the opinion
"they shouldn't even have a trial, they should just shoot him." (R.
1391).
22.

Mr.Enniss (R. 1398-1405) stated that he was familiar

with Mr. Gardner's previous criminal record.

He had also discussed

the incident with his colleagues at work. Mr. Enniss also stated
that at the time of the discussion he probably had an opinion that
the death penalty was warranted in this case, but that he had not
brought this up with his colleagues.
23.

Mrs. Davies (R. 1432-1442) had discussed the case with

a co-employee and stated that she had formed an initial opinion as
to Mr. Gardner's guilt. (R. 1438-1439).
24.

Mr. Bronson (R. 1442-1452), who stated during group

voir dire that he had no opinion regarding Gardner's guilt, when
asked his initial reaction stated he thought, "Boy, he must have
been awful stupid to do something like that."

(R. 1448-1449).

ADDENDUM B

PRIOR CONVICTION
AT GUILT PHASE

PRIOR CONVICTION
AT PENALTY PHASE

STATE

STATORY CITE

Alabama

§13A-5-40(a)(13)

Alaska

NO DEATH PENALTY

Arizona

no similar aggravating circumstances

Arkansas

§41-1303(3)

California

§190.2(a)(2)

Colorado

§16-ll-103(6)(a,b)

X

Connecticut

53a-46a(h)(2)

X

Delaware

§4209(e)(i)

X

Florida

§921.141(5)(b)

X

Georgia

§17-10-30(b)(l)

X

Hawaii

NO DEATH PENALTY

Idaho

§19-2515(g)(l)

X

Illinois

38 §9-l(b)(3)

X

Indiana

§35-50-2-9(b)(7)

X

Iowa

no similar aggravating circumstance
1
1
no similar aggravating circumstance

Kansas

X

X
X

Kentucky

!§532.025(2)(a)l

X

Louisiana

Art. 905.4(c)

X

Maine

NO DEATH PENALTY

OTHER
INFORMATION

PRIOR CONVICTION
AT GUILT PHASE

PRIOR CONVICTION
AT PENALTY PHASE

VTE

STATORY CITE

cyland
ssachusetts

Art. 27, S413(c)(iii)
and (d)(8)
Chap. 279, §69(a)(4)

shigan

NO DEATH PENALTY

nnesota

NO DEATH PENALTY

ssissippi

§99-19-101(5)(b)

X

ssouri

§565.032.2(1)

X

ntana

§46-18~303(8)(a,b)

X

braska

§29-2523(l)(a)

X

vada

§200.033.2

X

w Hampshire

§630:5(a)(2)

X

w Jersey

2C:ll-3c(4)(a)

X

w Mexico
w York

no similar aggravating circumstance
1
1
no similar aggravating circumstance

rth Carolina

§15A-2000(e)(2,3)

rth Dakota

no similar aggravating cii'cumstance

io

§2929.04(A)(5)

lahoma

§701.12.1

egon

§163.095(l)(c)

jnnsylvania

§9711(d)(9 and 11)

OTHER
INFORMATION

X
X

*X

*x

*§2929.022 allows
defendant to decide
if it is admitted at
guilt or penalty phas
*§163.103 allows
stipulation to agg.
circ. to keep from
jury.

PRIOR CONVICTION
AT GUILT PHASE

PRIOR CONVICTION
AT PENALTY PHASE

STATE

STATORY CITE

Rhode Island

NO DEATH PENALTY

South Carolina

§16-3-20(C)(a)(2)

X

South Dakota

Chap. 23A-27A-1

X

Tennessee

§39-2-203(i)(2)

X

Pexas

no similar aggravating circumstance

Jtah

S76-5-202(l)(h)

Vermont

NO DEATH PENALTY

r

Washington

no similar aggravating circumstance
1
1
no similar aggravating circumstance

lest Virginia

NO DEATH PENALTY

Wisconsin

;NO DEATH PENALTY

irginia

yoming

§6-2-102(h)(ii)

X

X

